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I see no response to the video link I gave a lot of contradictory statement's there!

They can say all they want to sell books but it does not change the fact that Saddam was non-compliant with weapons inspections for over 10 years..

and as late as 1998 Clinton bombed Iraq for what we imagine was to hit WMD.. but we really don't know what he bombed.

We do know that nothing much changed from the time that Dems and Repubs claimed that Saddam had WMD to resolution 1441..

Nonetheless, as President Bill Clinton acknowledged, more WMD were destroyed by UNSCOM than were destroyed during the Gulf War. Vast chemical stockpiles and Iraq's nuclear program infrastructure were destroyed. Indeed, many documents were discovered in 1995, revealing that Iraq had planned to build nuclear weapons by the end of 1991, and that this program was disrupted by the U.S. bombing of Iraq.

http://www.meforum.org/article/176

Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid (Arabic: حسين كامل حسن الماجد) (died February 23, 1996) was the son-in-law and second cousin of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. He defected to Jordan and took to helping the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA inspection teams assigned to look for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Jordan granted asylum to the Kamels, and there they began to cooperate with UNSCOM and its director Rolf Ekéus, the United States' CIA and the British MI6. Kamel provided the inspection teams with a wealth of information.

Kamel confirmed what inspectors had been able to ascertain shortly before his defection, that Iraq had a biological warfare program prior to the Gulf War, providing locations for large amounts of undeclared technical documentation. The defection appears to have had a psychological impact in Baghdad due to uncertainty over what Kamel would reveal: soon afterwards, inspectors were invited to revisit weapons sites and new documents were turned over for examination.

In a January 25, 1999 report to the U.N. Security Council, UNSCOM declared that the history of the Iraqi weapons inspections "must be divided into two parts, separated by the events following the departure from Iraq, in August 1995, of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel."

Kamel maintained that Iraq had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction and related programs after the end of the first Gulf War.

I ordered destruction of all chemical weapons. All weapons—biological, chemical, missile, nuclear—were destroyed.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hussein_Kamel

Do your own research if you don't believe me.. thorough bipartisan research.... Resolution 1441.. Clinton bombs Iraq in 1998.. Saddams non-compliance with weapons inspections and then get back to me.

The "problem" with Clinton's bombing of Iraq in 98 is that it seemed to have worked. If Bush had not had such a woody to invade Iraq Hans Blix would have had the time to confirm that.

if more Americans, including journalists, had actually DONE that research - America would not be there today.

where is the documentation that Clinton actually bombed WMD sites?

Actually after being on this forum I've disovered that the media did not do their job well enough because there are so many uninformed individuals who were only given one mantra...

As Mr O'Neill, who sat in countless national security council meetings, describes the mood: "It was all about finding a way to do it. The president saying 'Go find me a way to do this'."

"From the very beginning, there was a conviction that Saddam Hussein was a bad person and that he needed to go," Mr O'Neill told the CBS network programme, 60 Minutes. In the book, based largely on his recollections and written by an American journalist, Ron Suskind, Mr O'Neill said that even as far back as January 2001, when President Bush took office, no one in the NSC questioned the assumption that Iraq should be invaded.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/12/usa.books

02-01-2001

Second NSC meeting keeps focus on Iraq
O'Neill arrived a few minutes early and read the cover sheet of his briefing materials.

Purpose: To review the current state-of-play (including CIA briefing on Iraq) and to examine policy questions on how to proceed.

Attachments:

Tab A: Agenda and Policy Questions (from NSC) - SECRET

Tab B: Economic Background on Iraq (from Deutsche Bank)

Tab C: Executive Summary: Political-Military Plan for Post-Saddam Iraq Crisis (interagency working paper) - SECRET

Tab D: Summary of United States Sanctions on Iraq

Tab E: "Iraq Sanctions Regime," State Department, for use in public statements
Ron Suskind, The Price of Loyalty, p. 82, published 01-13-2004

http://downingstreetmemo.com/timeline/

02-11-2001 Rumsfeld: Iraq Not a Nuclear Threat
Mr. SNOW: Is Iraq a nuclear threat?

Mr. RUMSFELD: Iraq is probably not a nuclear threat at the present time. There's no question but that its nuclear capabilities were well advanced, and much farther advanced than Western intelligence capabilities knew. And we were very fortunate that the Israelis went in some time before, and took out their nuclear capability.
Fox News Sunday, published 02-11-2001

02-11-2001


02-11-2001 Powell: Saddam much weaker but still a threat
MS. BORGER: This is, as you know, the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War. Do you believe Saddam Hussein is stronger or weaker than he was?

SECRETARY POWELL: He's weaker, he's much weaker. That million-man army of ten years ago is gone. He is sitting on a very much smaller army of perhaps 350,000 that does not have the capacity to invade its neighbors any longer. He is living in three concentric rings of jails that he has created for himself in order to protect himself behind a security cordon. He has a great deal of money available to him through our Oil-for-Food Program, which he refuses to use entirely for the benefit of his people and for his children. Instead, he continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction to threaten the people and children of the region.
CBS - Face the Nation, published 02-12-2001


02-23-2001 Powell: Containment a Success
"I think we ought to declare [the containment policy] a success. We have kept him contained, kept him in his box."

He added Saddam "is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors" and that "he threatens not the United States."
State Dept Press Briefing, published 02-23-2001

02-24-2001 Powell: Saddam has "no significant WMD capability"
…[Saddam] has not developed any significant capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction. He is unable to project conventional power against his neighbors.
Press Remarks with Foreign Minister of Egypt, published 02-24-2001



03-06-2001 Powell: Sanctions will prevent Iraq from acquiring WMD
Secretary of State Colin Powell said the modified Iraq sanctions policy will prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from acquiring weapons of mass destruction but allow Iraqi civilians to obtain needed consumer goods.

"We will keep them from developing their military capability again, just the way we have for the last ten years, but we will not be the ones to blame because the Iraqi people, it is claimed, are not getting what they need to take care of their children or to take care of their needs," Powell said at a press conference with Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh in Washington March 6.

Powell said he has received expressions of support from Arab leaders about the modified Iraq sanctions policy.
State Dept - Washington File, published 03-06-2001

04-30-2001 2000 State Dept Terror report: No mention of ties between Iraq and Islamic fundamentalist terrorism.
"Iraq planned and sponsored international terrorism in 2000. Although Baghdad focused on antidissident activity overseas, the regime continued to support various terrorist groups. The regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.

Several expatriate terrorist groups continued to maintain offices in Baghdad, including the Arab Liberation Front, the inactive 15 May Organization, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). PLF leader Abu Abbas appeared on state-controlled television in the fall to praise Iraq's leadership in rallying Arab opposition to Israeli violence against Palestinians. The ANO threatened to attack Austrian interests unless several million dollars in a frozen ANO account in a Vienna bank were turned over to the group.

The Iraq-supported Iranian terrorist group, Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), regularly claimed responsibility for armed incursions into Iran that targeted police and military outposts, as well as for mortar and bomb attacks on security organization headquarters in various Iranian cities. MEK publicists reported that in March group members killed an Iranian colonel having intelligence responsibilities. An MEK claim to have wounded a general was denied by the Iranian Government. The Iraqi regime deployed MEK forces against its domestic opponents."
State Dept - "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism", published 04-30-2001



05-15-2001 Powell: Iraq has not been successful in developing WMD
SENATOR BENNETT: Mr. Secretary, the U.N. sanctions on Iraq expire the beginning of June. We've had bombs dropped, we've had threats made, we've had all kinds of activity vis-a-vis Iraq in the previous administration. Now we're coming to the end. What's our level of concern about the progress of Saddam Hussein's chemical and biological weapons programs?

SECRETARY POWELL: The sanctions, as they are called, have succeeded over the last 10 years, not in deterring him from moving in that direction, but from actually being able to move in that direction. The Iraqi regime militarily remains fairly weak. It doesn't have the capacity it had 10 or 12 years ago. It has been contained. And even though we have no doubt in our mind that the Iraqi regime is pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological and nuclear -- I think the best intelligence estimates suggest that they have not been terribly successful. There's no question that they have some stockpiles of some of these sorts of weapons still under their control, but they have not been able to break out, they have not been able to come out with the capacity to deliver these kinds of systems or to actually have these kinds of systems that is much beyond where they were 10 years ago.

So containment, using this arms control sanctions regime, I think has been reasonably successful. We have not been able to get the inspectors back in, though, to verify that, and we have not been able to get the inspectors in to pull up anything that might be left there. So we have to continue to view this regime with the greatest suspicion, attribute to them the most negative motives, which is quite well-deserved with this particular regime, and roll the sanctions over, and roll them over in a way where the arms control sanctions really go after their intended targets -- weapons of mass destruction -- and not go after civilian goods or civilian commodities that we really shouldn't be going after, just let that go to the Iraqi people. That wasn't the purpose of the oil-for-food program. And by reconfiguring them in that way, I think we can gain support for this regime once again.

When we came into office on the 20th of January, the whole sanctions regime was collapsing in front of our eyes. Nations were bailing out on it. We lost the consensus for this kind of regime because the Iraqi regime had successfully painted us as the ones causing the suffering of the Iraqi people, when it was the regime that was causing the suffering. They had more than enough money; they just weren't spending it in the proper way. And we were getting the blame for it. So reconfiguring the sanctions, I think, helps us and continues to contain the Iraqi regime.
Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Commitee, published 05-15-2001


07-29-2001 Rice discusses success of Iraq sanctions
RICE: Well, in fact, John, we have made progress on the sanctions. We, in fact, had four of the five, of the permanent five, ready to go along with smart sanctions. We'll work with the Russians. I'm sure that we'll come to some resolution there, because it is important to restructure these sanctions to something that work.

But in terms of Saddam Hussein being there, let's remember that his country is divided, in effect. He does not control the northern part of his country. We are able to keep arms from him. His military forces have not been rebuilt.

This has been a successful period, but obviously we would like to increase pressure on him, and we're going to go about doing that.
CNN - Late Edition, published 07-29-2001



08-17-2001 Energy Dept concludes Iraqi aluminum tubes could not be used for nuclear enrichment centrifuge
After Senior Bush official receive information from the CIA that Iraq planned on buying 60,000 high-strength 7075-T6 aluminum tubes to use in uraniun enrichment, the Energy Dept. debunks the notion.

In a report on the tubes, they set forth numerous reasons why the tubes are ill-suited for the job and could not be used in that application.

[Original NY Times article for a fee.]
New York Times, published 10-03-2004



09-11-2001 General Wesley Clark says WH pressured him to blame Iraq for 9/11
Wesley Clark told anchor Tim Russert that Bush administration officials had engaged in a campaign to implicate Saddam Hussein in the September 11 attacks-- starting that very day. Clark said that he'd been called on September 11 and urged to link Baghdad to the terror attacks, but declined to do so because of a lack of evidence.

CLARK: "There was a concerted effort during the fall of 2001, starting immediately after 9/11, to pin 9/11 and the terrorism problem on Saddam Hussein."

RUSSERT: "By who? Who did that?"

CLARK: "Well, it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House. It came from all over. I got a call on 9/11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, 'You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein.' I said, 'But--I'm willing to say it, but what's your evidence?' And I never got any evidence."
NBC - Meet the Press, published 06-15-2003


09-16-2001 Cheney: Saddam contained, no evidence of connection to 9/11
VICE PRES. CHENEY: There is--in the past, there have been some activities related to terrorism by Saddam Hussein. But at this stage, you know, the focus is over here on al-Qaida and the most recent events in New York. Saddam Hussein's bottled up [contained], at this point, but clearly, we continue to have a fairly tough policy where the Iraqis are concerned.

MR. RUSSERT: Do we have any evidence linking Saddam Hussein or Iraqis to this operation [9/11]?

VICE PRES. CHENEY: No.
NBC - Meet the Press, published 09-16-2001



09-20-2001 AEI's David Wurmser suggests attacking a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq"
Days after 9/11, a senior Pentagon official lamented the lack of good targets in Afghanistan and proposed instead U.S. military attacks in South America or Southeast Asia as "a surprise to the terrorists," according to a footnote in the recent 9/11 Commission Report. The unsigned top-secret memo, which the panel's report said appears to have been written by Defense Under Secretary Douglas Feith, is one of several Pentagon documents uncovered by the commission which advance unorthodox ideas for the war on terror. The memo suggested "hitting targets outside the Middle East in the initial offensive" or a "non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq," the panel's report states. U.S. attacks in Latin America and Southeast Asia were portrayed as a way to catch the terrorists off guard when they were expecting an assault on Afghanistan.

The memo's content, NEWSWEEK has learned, was in part the product of ideas from a two-man secret Pentagon intelligence unit appointed by Feith after 9/11: veteran defense analyst Michael Maloof and Mideast expert David Wurmser, now a top foreign-policy aide to****Cheney. Maloof and Wurmser saw links between international terror groups that the CIA and other intelligence agencies dismissed. They argued that an attack on terrorists in South America—for example, a remote region on the border of Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil where intelligence reports said Iranian-backed Hizbullah had a presence—would have ripple effects on other terrorist operations. The proposals were floated to top foreign-policy advisers. But White House officials stress they were regarded warily and never adopted.

[Footnote in question is number 75 for Chapter 10.]

[Despite their description of Iraq as a "non-Al Qaeda target", Feith soon hired the pair to look for any possible links between Iraq and al Qaeda.]
Newsweek, published 08-09-2004

(Washington, DC) Judicial Watch, the public interest group that fights government corruption, today released a declassified “Secret/NOFORN” State Department intelligence analysis cable, dated March 4, 2002, from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Office of Analysis for Africa. The analysis, entitled, “Niger-Iraq: Sale of Niger Uranium to Iraq Unlikely,” was part of a larger analysis document for the week of February 25 – March 3, 2002, approximately ten months prior to President Bush’s 2003 State of the Union address, where he claimed Iraqi leadership attempted to obtain uranium from Niger, and one year before the war in Iraq was initiated.

The possibility that a corrupt, former President of Niger – Bare Mainassara – may have negotiated with Iraq is discussed in the analysis, but discounted since his presidential guard killed him in April 1999 during a coup. The analysis also points out that President Tandja – the current president – is very aware that the financing of Niger’s day-to-day government operations and its development aid are entirely dependent of foreign assistance. The analysis states that an Iraqi pay-off of $50 to $100 million would not make up for what would be lost if foreign aid donations stopped.

The analysis states: “Niger probably is not planning to sell uranium to Iraq, in part because France controls the uranium industry in Niger and would take action to block the sale . . . ,” and, “. . . there are French managers and engineers at every point in the mining, milling and transportation process.”

Finally, the analysis describes the extreme difficulty of “secretly” transporting 500 tons of “off-the-books” uranium on 25 “hard-to-conceal” 10-ton tractor trailers across 1,000 miles from land-locked Niger to the sea, crossing at least one foreign border.

“These documents provide grist for both sides of the debate over President Bush’s claim in his January 2003 State of the Union address,” said Judicial Watch President Tom Fitton. “On the one hand, they seem to confirm the president’s assertion that Iraq was attempting to buy uranium. On the other hand, they suggest that such a deal would have been difficult to consummate.”

Judicial Watch obtained the document under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, having successfully appealed an earlier State Department decision to withhold the document from disclosure. Portions of the document contain redactions of classified material made by both the State Department and the CIA.

http://www.judicialwatch.org/story/2006/jan/state-department-declared-
niger-uranium-sale-iraq-unlikely-march-2002

A Pentagon committee led by Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, advised President Bush to include a reference in his January State of the Union address about Iraq trying to purchase 500 tons of uranium from Niger to bolster the case for war in Iraq, despite the fact that the CIA warned Wolfowitz's committee that the information was unreliable, according to a CIA intelligence official and four members of the Senate's intelligence committee who have been investigating the issue.

http://www.counterpunch.org/leopold07172003.html

Bush proposed an alternative: paint a U.S. spy plane in United Nations colors and see if that didn't tempt Hussein's forces to shoot at it. In any case, he said, the war was "penciled in" for March 10 and the United States would go ahead with or without a second U.N. resolution.

Blair replied that he was "solidly with" the president.

That is the gist of an account of the Jan. 31, 2003, meeting contained in the new edition of "Lawless World," a book by British author Philippe Sands. He has not identified the writer of the memorandum on which the account is based, but British media reports say it was one of the aides in attendance: Sir David Manning, then security advisor to Blair and now the British ambassador in Washington.

http://www.thewashingtonnote.com/archives/001238.php

Sept 5 2002

CIA Director George Tenet appears before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in a secret session to discuss the agency’s intelligence on Iraq. Graham and Durbin ask to see the latest NIE on Iraq and learn none exists. Tenet: “We’ve never done a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, including its weapons of mass destruction.” Graham orders an NIE be produced, but Tenet resists.

Sept 10 2002

Classified briefing by Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet to some members of Congress, including Minority Whip Nancy Pelosi from California, ranking Democrat on the House intelligence committee, Rep. Robert Menendez, Sen.****Durbin, who are unconvinced.

Sept 11 2002

* Tenet agrees to produce an NIE after Graham sends a certified letter demanding one.
* Sen. John Edwards calls for overthrow of Saddam Hussein with or without the UN.

http://intelsuss.wordpress.com/

The National Intelligence Council was formed in 1973 to serve, according to an N.I.E. definition, as "a bridge between the intelligence and policy communities, a source of deep substantive expertise on critical national security issues, and as a focal point for intelligence community collaboration.

The NIC's goal is to provide policymakers with the best, unvarnished, and unbiased information--regardless of whether analytic judgments conform to U.S. policy."


http://middleeast.about.com/od/glossary/g/me071203.htm

... gotta wonder about this one.... do you really want to bomb a WMD site? isn't that a bad idea?... or is this rationalized with the Styrofoam and saran wrap of the word "collateral damage"?

steven I think what we have here is a failure to communicate.. the Democrat politicians are trying to communicate to their constituants that Bush outsmarted them so their votes don't count for the Iraq War. Because as you know the Democrats didn't end the War as they promised so plan B is to up the anty with the Intel information which is so so lame and old.. we're just not buying it.

The truth is that at the time of the attack he was complying and it was Bush's lie that he was not. The inspectors reports do not support your worn out lie of a claim.