Still never said it didn't. So you are arguing a mute point.

Still never said it didn't. So you are arguing a mute point.


Irony at it's finest.

Irony at it's finest.

Still never said it didn't. So you are arguing a mute point.

"Stay where you are...really...we will be ok."

I'm sick of it being assumed I "chose"to be a single mother.

I am not a fan of the single mother term and i didnt choose to be one.

so women how say there not looking for a guy to take care of there kids are not looking for LTR gets STR or FWB. because it seem by asking LTR you are asking him to do it. so i may be wrong but the guy may think you saying i not looking for a guy to take care of my kid that the relationship is just a fling.

-I don't know for sure about anywhere else but in Texas unless the child is yours or you have adopted the child then you are not going to have to pay child support.

Analysis

Under section 160.631 of the Texas Family Code, a man excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing shall be adjudicated as not being the father of the child unless the results of other genetic testing are admitted to rebut the results of the genetic testing. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.631(d) (Vernon 2002). Here, the trial court correctly found that Knox was not K.R.K.'s biological parent.

In an attempt to establish paternity in spite of the trial court's finding that he was not K.R.K.'s biological father, Knox relied on the common law doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel in paternity actions is "the legal determination that because of a person's conduct, that person will not be permitted to litigate parentage." In re Shockley, 123 S.W.3d 642, 651 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2003, no pet.); see also Hausman v. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d 38, 41 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2006, no pet.). In order to succeed on this claim, Knox had to establish that a parent-child relationship between K.R.K. and himself was in K.R.K.'s best interest and that the elements of common law equitable estoppel were met. Hausman, 199 S.W.2d at 42; Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 652.

The application of the doctrine of estoppel in paternity actions is designed to achieve fairness as between the parents by holding them to their prior course of conduct regarding the paternity of the child. Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 651-52; see also Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 42. It is based on the public policy that children should be secure in knowing who their parents are so that they will be secure from the potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that a father the child has known all her life is not her father. Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 652; see also Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 42. Thus, courts are most inclined to impose equitable estoppel to protect the status of a child in a "recognized and operative parent-child relationship." Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 652. Each such case must be determined on its own facts with the child's best interest being "of paramount concern." Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 652-53; see also Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 42; Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.001(a)(1) (Vernon 2002) ("The public policy of this state is to assure that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child. . . .").

We therefore consider whether Knox bore his burden of establishing (1) that Stamper was equitably estopped from denying his paternity and (2) that it was in K.R.K.'s best interest that he be declared her father even though it had been conclusively established that he was not K.R.K.'s biological father.

Equitable Estoppel

To establish the elements of equitable estoppel, a person seeking to prohibit another from litigating parentage must prove that (1) there was a false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts; (3) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of those facts; (4) with the intention that it be acted upon; and (5) the party to whom it was made must have relied on the misrepresentation to his prejudice. Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 653).

To prevail on his equitable estoppel defense, Knox first had to show that Stamper deliberately misled him regarding K.R.K.'s paternity with the intention that he act on her misrepresentation. The trial court heard evidence that Stamper had a sexual relationship with both Knox and Taylor at the time K.R.K. was conceived. Although Stamper and Taylor both noticed the resemblance between K.R.K. and Taylor's son from another relationship, Stamper, Knox, and Taylor all testified that they believed K.R.K. to be Knox's child until the time Knox petitioned for divorce and had genetic testing conducted. Thus, Knox has presented no evidence to support an affirmative finding on any of the first three elements of estoppel. See Hausman, 199 S.W.3d at 43 (citing Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 653).

Nor is there any evidence that Stamper intended to deceive Knox into believing that K.R.K. was his child to Knox's prejudice. We have found no evidence that Stamper encouraged Knox to participate in K.R.K.'s life or otherwise led him to rely on the mistaken view that he was K.R.K.'s father. Cf. Shockley, 123 S.W.3d at 653 (citing the elements of equitable estoppel). To the contrary, there is substantial evidence of Stamper's attempts to protect K.R.K. from any participation by Knox in her life, including moving from Galveston County with K.R.K., obtaining a restraining order in the Houston court against Knox's having any contact with K.R.K. which is to remain in effect until 2009, and vigorously pursuing legal efforts to have Knox declared not to be the father of K.R.K. on biological or equitable estoppel grounds.

We hold that Knox failed to bear his burden of proving the elements of equitable estoppel.

http://www.1stcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/HTMLOpinion.asp?OpinionID=85253