What deabte?, you have yet to geta single fact of history or law correct, i understood he was sick of your ignorance and willingness to be dishonest.

3 occaisns existed to create laws to allow the use of force to prevent secesion, in every one it was denied. heres some quotes from those debates.


The more I reflect on the use of force, the more I doubt the practicability, the justice, and the efficacy of it, when applied to people collectively, and not individually. A Union of the States containing such an ingredient seems to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. I hope that such a system will be framed as might render this resource unnecessary.

madison

It has been observed, to coerce States is one of the maddest projects ever devised. A failure of compliance will never be confined to a single State. This being the case, can we suppose it wise to hazard a civil war? Suppose Massachusetts or any large State should refuse, and Congress should attempt to compel them, would they not have influence to procure assistance, especially from those States which are in the same situation as themselves? What picture does this idea present to our view? A complying State at war with a non-complying State, Congress marching the troops of one State into the bosom of another — this State collecting auxiliaries, and forming, perhaps, a majority against its Federal head. Here is a nation at war with itself. Can any reasonable man be well-disposed towards a Government which makes war and carnage the only means of supporting itself — a Government that can exist only by the sword

hamilton.

Whether Congress has the constitutional right to make war against one or more States, and require the Executive of the Federal Government to carry it on by means of force to be drawn from the other States, is a question for Congress itself to consider. It must be admitted that no such power is expressly given; nor are there any words in the Constitution which imply it. Among the powers enumerated in Article I, section 8, is that, "to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning captures on land and water." This certainly means nothing more than the power to commence and carry on hostilities against the foreign enemies of the nation. Another clause in the same section gives Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the militia," and to use them within the limits of a State. But this power is so restricted by the words which immediately follow, that it can be exercised only for one of the following purposes: 1. To execute the laws of the Union, that is, to aid the Federal officers in the performance of their regular duties. 2. To suppress insurrection against the States, but this is confined by Article IV, section 4, to cases in which the State herself shall apply for assistance against her own people. 3. To repel invasion of a State by enemies who come from abroad to assail her in her own territory. All these provisions are to protect the States, not to authorize an attack by one part of the country upon another; to preserve their peace, and not lunge them into civil war. Our forefathers do not seem to have thought that war was calculated to "form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." There was undoubtedly a strong and universal conviction among the men who framed and ratified the Constitution that military force would not only be useless but pernicious as a means of holding the States (Union) together.
If it be true that war cannot be declared, nor a system of general hostilities carried on by the Central Government against a State, then it seems to follow that an attempt to do so would ipso facto be an expulsion of such State from the Union. And if Congress shall break up the Union by unconstitutionally putting strife and enmity and armed hostility between different sections of the country, instead of the "domestic tranquility" which the Constitution was meant to insure, will not all the States be absolved from their Federal obligations? Is any portion of the people bound to contribute their money or their blood to carry on a contest like that?
The right of the Central Government to preserve itself in its whole constitutional vigor by repelling a direct and positive aggression upon its property or its officers cannot be denied. But this is a totally different thing from an offensive war to punish the people for the political misdeeds of their State government, or to prevent a threatened violation of the Constitution, or to enforce an acknowledgment that the Government of the United States is supreme. The States are colleagues of one another, and if some of them shall conquer the rest and hold them as subjugated provinces, it would totally destroy the whole theory upon which they are now connected.(


US AG opion to the president on the use of force against the states that had left.

"How absurd it is to suppose that, when different parties enter into a compact for certain purposes, either can disregard any one provision, and expect, nevertheless, the other to observe the rest! ...[I]f the Northern States refuse, willfully and deliberately, to carry into effect [a] part of the Constitution... and Congress provides no remedy, the South would no longer be bound to observe the compact. A bargain can not be broken on one side, and still bind the other side." D Webster.

Who are parties to it? The people — but not the people as composing one great body; but the people as composing thirteen sovereignties: were it, as the gentleman [Henry] asserts, a consolidated government, the assent of a majority of the people would be sufficient for its establishment, and as a majority have adopted it already, the remaining States would be bound by the act of the majority, even if they unanimously reprobated it: were it such a government as is suggested, it would be now binding on the people of this State [Virginia], without having had the privilege of deliberating upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will be then a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the Legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the existing and proposed governments is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent, derivative authority of the Legislatures of the States, whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people.


Madison expalining who we the people was/ment and what they were doing when they entered into the constitional compact. he goes on.