| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 9:18:37 AM | One underreported story recently was this one I stumbled across recently. The V-22 Osprey is a combination airplane/helicopter (in it's flight envelope capacities) which has had a long and troubled history.
It's cost a fortune in development, and may in fact reach a price tag of 55 billion by it's end.
Now it's an aircraft that shows some positives. It's main advantage is it's ability to transition from airplane to helicopter and back again. That means it can land and take of in tight areas, and still fly at high speeds (much higher than traditional helicopters) in between.
That ability has saved lives, in medivac missions.
There are some rather astounding negatives, however, one's that are rather troubling in combat zone use.
The first is it's lack of an autorotation capacity if an engine is lost in it's "helo" mode. For those not familiar with the term, an autorotation is a common helicopter technique used in emergency landings when engine power is lost.
In 2002 the Marines abandoned the requirement that the planes be capable of autorotating (as the maneuver is called), with unpowered but spinning helicopter blades slowly letting the aircraft land safely. That decision, a top Pentagon aviation consultant wrote in a confidential 2003 report obtained by TIME, is "unconscionable" for a wartime aircraft. "When everything goes wrong, as it often does in a combat environment," he said, "autorotation is all a helicopter pilot has to save his and his passengers' lives."
As originally designed, the V-22 was supposed to survive a loss of engine power when flying like a helicopter by autorotating toward the ground, just as maple seeds do in the fall. Autorotation, which turns a normally soft touchdown into an very hard emergency landing, is at least survivable. It became clear, however, that the design of the Osprey, adjusted many times over, simply could not accommodate the maneuver. The Pentagon slowly conceded the point. "The lack of proven autorotative capability is cause for concern in tilt-rotor aircraft," a 1999 report warned. Two years later, a second study cautioned that the V-22's "probability of a successful autorotational landing ... is very low." Unable to rewrite the laws of physics, the Pentagon determined that the ability to perform the safety procedure was no longer a necessary requirement and crossed it off the V-22's must-have list. "An autorotation to a safe landing is no longer a formal requirement," a 2002 Pentagon report said. "The deletion of safe autorotation landing as a ... requirement recognizes the hybrid nature of the tilt-rotor."
Indeed it does, but that doesn't make the aircraft any safer. The plane's backers said that the chance of a dual-engine failure was so rare that it shouldn't be of concern. Yet the flight manual lists a variety of things that can cause both engines to fail, including "contaminated fuel ... software malfunctions or battle damage." The lone attempted V-22 autorotation "failed miserably," according to an internal 2003 report, obtained by TIME, written by the Institute for Defense Analyses, an in-house Pentagon think tank. "The test data indicate that the aircraft would have impacted the ground at a ... fatal rate of descent."
Helicopter expert Rex Rivolo, who called the decision to deploy the V-22 without proven autorotation capability "unconscionable" in that confidential 2003 Pentagon study, declined to be interviewed. But in his report, Rivolo noted that up to 90% of the helicopters lost in the Vietnam War were in their final approach to landing when they were hit by enemy ground fire. About half of those were able to autorotate safely to the ground, "thereby saving the crews," Rivolo wrote. "Such events in V-22 would all be fatal."
Faced with killing the program — or possibly killing those aboard the V-22 — the Marines have opted to save the plane and have largely shifted responsibility for surviving such a catastrophe from the designers to the pilots. While the engineers spent years vainly trying to solve the problem, pilots aboard a stricken V-22 will have just seconds to react. But tellingly, pilots have never practiced the maneuver outside the simulator — the flight manual forbids it — and even in simulators the results have been less than reassuring. "In simulations," the flight manual warns, "the outcome of the landings varied widely due to the extreme sensitivity to pilot technique and timing." The director of the Pentagon's testing office, in a 2005 report, put it more bluntly. If power is lost when a V-22 is flying like a helicopter below 1,600 ft. (490 m), he said, emergency landings "are not likely to be survivable."
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835-1,00.html
Now that's a serious concern in such a craft, especially in a combat zone.
There are some other ones, especially troubling considering the above.
It only has one small caliber gun aboard, rearward facing, that cannot be fired unless the loading ramp in lowered, which means it's only use is after landing.
Retired General James Jones, who recently led a study into the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, is a V-22 supporter. But when he ran the Marines from 1999 to 2003, he insisted the plane be outfitted with a hefty, forward-aimed .50-cal. machine gun. "It's obviously technically feasible. We've got nose-mounted guns on [helicopter gunship] Cobras and other flying platforms, and I thought all along this one should have it too," he says.
The Marines saluted, awarding a $45 million contract in 2000 for the development of a swiveling triple-barreled .50-cal. machine gun under the V-22's nose, automatically aimed through a sight in the co-pilot's helmet. "All production aircraft will be outfitted with this defensive weapons system," the Marine colonel in charge of the program pledged in 2000. The weapon "provides the V-22 with a strong defensive firepower capability to greatly increase the aircraft's survivability in hostile actions," the Bell-Boeing team said. But the added weight (1,000 lbs., or 450 kg) and cost ($1.5 million per V-22) ultimately pushed the gun into the indefinite future.
So 10 V-22s are going to war this month, each with just a lone, small 7.62-mm machine gun mounted on its rear ramp. The gun's rounds are about the same size as a .30-06 hunting rifle's, and it is capable of firing only where the V-22 has been — not where it's going — and only when the ramp used by Marines to get on and off the aircraft is lowered. That doesn't satisfy Jones. "I just fundamentally believe than an assault aircraft that goes into hot landing zones should have a nose-mounted gun," Jones told TIME. "I go back to my roots a little bit," the Vietnam veteran says. "I just like those kinds of airplanes to have the biggest and best gun we can get, and that to me was a requirement." He doesn't think much of the V-22's current weapon: "A rear-mounted gun is better than no gun at all, but I don't know how much better."
The Marines say combat jets or helicopter gunships will shadow V-22s flying into dangerous areas. And backers say the V-22's speed will help it elude threats. It could, for example, zip into harm's way at more than 200 m.p.h. (320 km/h), convert to helicopter mode and then land within seconds. It could pause on the ground to deliver or pick up Marines and then hustle from the landing zone. Various missile-warning systems and fire-extinguishing gear bolster its survivability. If it is hit, redundant hydraulic and flight-control systems will help keep it airborne. Finally, Marines say, if the V-22 does crash, its crumpling fuselage and collapsing seats will help cushion those on board.
- Ibid
If that's not bad enough, there are some other concerns :
Critics have had long-standing concerns about the poor field of view for pilots, the cramped and hot quarters for passengers and the V-22's unusually high need for maintenance. A flawed computer chip that could have led to crashes forced a V-22 grounding in February; bad switches that could have doomed the aircraft surfaced in June. In March the Government Accountability Office warned that V-22s are rolling off the production line in Amarillo, Texas, and being accepted by the Marines "with numerous deviations and waivers," including "several potentially serious defects." An internal Marine memo warned in June that serious and persistent reliability issues could "significantly" reduce the aircraft's anticipated role in Iraq. V-22s built before 2005, the report said, are fully ready to fly only 35% of the time, while newer models, like those in Iraq, are 62% ready. But "sustained high-tempo operations in [Iraq]," the memo warns, could drive down the readiness rates for the newer V-22s.
-Ibid
The Marines have also cut corners in the development program :
Probes into the deadly 2000 crashes revealed that in a rush to deploy the aircraft, the Marines had dangerously cut corners in their testing program. The number of different flight configurations — varying speed, weight and other factors — flown by test pilots to ensure safe landings was reduced by half to meet deadlines. Then only two-thirds of those curtailed flight tests were conducted. That trend continues: while a 2004 plan called for 131 hours of nighttime flight tests, the Marines managed to run only 33 on the Osprey. Why the shortcuts? Problems with a gearbox kept many V-22s and pilots grounded. That meant many pilots lacked the hours required to qualify for night flying. Similarly, sea trials were curtailed because the ship designated to assist with Osprey tests could spare only 10 of the 21 days needed.
There's also been controversy over a sandstorm test for the craft. The V-22's tendency to generate a dust storm when it lands in desert-like terrain wasn't examined because "an unusually wet spring resulted in a large amount of vegetation that prevented severe brownouts during landing attempts," the Pentagon's top tester noted. But the program continued, albeit with a caution about the aircraft's ability to fly in dusty conditions.
After the 2000 grounding, Osprey pilots were told to fly less aggressively, which critics say is the only reason no V-22 has crashed since. "They keep talking about all the things it can do, but little by little its operations are being more and more restricted," says Philip Coyle, who monitored the V-22's development as the Pentagon's top weapons tester from 1994 to 2001. The V-22 can fly safely "if used like a truck, carrying people from one safe area to another safe area," he says. "But I don't see them using it in combat situations where they will have to do a lot of maneuvering."
- Ibid
It has another built in design flaw :
But at least one problem—vortex ring state (VRS)—can never be fixed or eliminated. And “flying around” the VRS problem by slowing the descent rate of the V-22 makes the Osprey more vulnerable than helicopters (despite claims that it is more survivable).
VRS is a fundamental technical characteristic that cannot be remedied by design changes. The only real solution is to restrict V-22 operations to avoid VRS (that is, to descend at lower rates of speed). The specified descent rate for the V-22 to avoid VRS is 800 feet per minute (fpm) at 40 knots.Modern helicopters can descend at rates more than twice as fast. And as one V-22 critic points out, “While that [800 fpm] would be adequate for a commercial operation, it’s far short of what the military needs—several thousand feet per minute—during tactical insertions.”
In this respect, the V-22 might actually be more vulnerable to hostile fire than are traditional helicopters.
ttp://72.14.205.104/search?q=cache:NjWKb6IvJPgJ:cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb72.pdf+The+V-22+Osprey+%2B+ protection&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=13&gl=ca
The plane’s most widely cited design problem is that one of its propellers can get caught in its own turbulence as it comes in for a landing, and that can cause the V-22 to roll over and head into the ground.
For that reason, V-22 pilots are trained to steer clear of their own turbulence by rules prohibiting them from making the quick maneuvers used by helicopters to evade enemy fire. Instead, the V-22 must land at speeds as slow as nine miles an hour and in a fairly straight line.
A 2005 Pentagon report said these limitations “may prove insufficient” in protecting the V-22 from ground fire. As a result, that Pentagon evaluation said the V-22 was suited only for low- and medium-threat environments, and is not “operationally effective” in high-threat environments.
Some critics say that in the heat of battle, V-22 pilots could forget these restrictions and move in ways that could bring the craft down.
“The V-22 cannot do radical evasive maneuvers” said Lee Gaillard, author of a report critical of the V-22, “Wonder Weapon or Widow Maker” for the Center for Defense Information, which studies weapons programs. “But that’s what it will need for combat.”
The Marines defend the V-22 by saying it provides a margin of safety a helicopter cannot.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/14/business/14osprey.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper&oref=slogin
It's also lightly armoured :
- The Osprey has survivability features like self-sealing tanks and composite structures that will allow the airplane to take hits and keep on going. However, one of the other features of a composite fuselage is bullets don't bounce off, they pass through like a hot knife through butter. The airplane may survive an encounter with small arms fire, but Marines flying in back might not. Another prediction: Just like the Humvee, the Marines will "up-armor" V-22s in time. They didn't do it to date because that would've kept the airplane from attaining its Key Performance Parameters (payload, range, etc.) during OPEVAL.
http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_tactical_development.html
Pentagon reports also say the V-22 is too cramped for the 24 marines it can carry. The marines are so packed into the windowless cabin that they can become airsick, their legs can grow numb and leaving the plane quickly is difficult.
There is no bathroom on board and marines have criticized the “piddle packs” they are to use as insufficient. And, there is no place on board to store them once they are full.
V-22 downdraft is so strong, and moves in so many directions that it can create “brownout” conditions, making it difficult for pilots to see and potentially knocking down marines on the ground.
As a result, when rope ladders are used, the V-22 must hover at higher altitudes, making marines more vulnerable to fire.
In preparation for deployment, the Pentagon ran tests last year in the New Mexico desert, similar to the climate of Iraq. In January, the Pentagon wrote about frequent failures with various parts and systems. The reason: “Extended exposure to the desert operating environment.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/14/business/14osprey.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=todayspaper
So are we looking at a political decision here, or a tactical one ?
In examining all the combat weaknesses of an aircraft like the Osprey, is this simply using something as a test bed that might prove to be a very costly experiment in men and machines ?
In essence we have a high cost technological wonder that has critical flaws in a combat zone , many of them compounding each other. It cannot pull high G's to avoid gunfire, it's landing speed is far slower than a traditional helo, and if it's engine stops in mid air it's aerodynamically instantly a brick.
It's prop wash during it's helo mode is so great that anyone using a rope descent is limited in their speed of egress, and that type of buffeting in a desert environment (especially in a n aircraft that's not had much testing in such conditions) may create great problems in visibility and wear and tear.
And it's essentially unarmed, during flight. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 9:43:17 AM | I live in Amarillo, where the Osprey is made and tested by Bell Helicopter. They certainly look ungainly in flight whether the rotors are vertical or tilted forward. They are LOUD as well. As far as saying they will be using them for war is highly doubtful IMO. Too slow and too loud. I can see them being used in a supporting role in "No fly/fire zones", but they were certainly not designed to be attack aircraft.
I have a friend at Cannon AFB that works on Ospreys as a mechanic. He tells me they are stable, and the pilots who fly them like 'em just fine. But they are nothing like a Falcon or a Tomcat.
I wouldn't worry too much.... Like I said, they aren't going over to replace our tried and true warplanes. Good post MG! Have a great day | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 9:49:50 AM | | I saw this in 'Time ' mag last year seems they are spectacular.........at crashing. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 9:57:52 AM | so far the plane has killed more Americans then terrorists. i wonder if it will keep up it's rep?
or will Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden lobby the Us gov and other governments to produce the osprey in greater numbers? | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 10:00:06 AM | | I would like to see the proof that the Osprey has killed more than 3000 Americans, if you can provide it for me..... | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 10:04:57 AM |
or will al qeada and O sama Bin Laden lobby the U.S.government and other governments to produce the osprey in greater numbers There is an idea maybe make a bunch and fly them to Iraq and leave them hoping that the terrorists will use them .fill them up with insurgents and crash them into other insurgents,on the ground? | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 10:17:07 AM |
I would like to see the proof that the Osprey has killed more than 3000 Americans, if you can provide it for me.....
I agree, the Osprey may suck, but it hasn't killed that many people. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 10:35:42 AM | I agree, the Osprey may suck, but it hasn't killed that many people. Actually, it has killed at least 30 people during testing and demos alone, one of the highest death rates for any aircraft under development. Not quite 3000, but still a record of sorts.
The Osprey, while an incredibly cool concept, is a poster child for the US military's "only in US made" bias.
Years before the Osprey entered development the US, Canada and the UK were looking at the Canadair CL-84 (a virtualy identical concept but using a tilt-wing rather than tilt-rotor design) that was massively superior to the Osprey in all of the areas where the Osprey has flaws.
The project was killed in '74, largely due to the fact that it couldn't overcome the "made in the USA" bias. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 2:58:06 PM | The other thing is a tactical situation. If you use an Osprey for a tactical insertion, you are already landing with an airframe that's heavily overcrowded. Used in a combat situation, where you have a high chance of taking wounded, that means potential problems getting everyone back on board.
It's only going to take a couple of seriously wounded Marines, and you are even more overcrowded on the return trip.
Perhaps one reason for the sudden use of the Osprey comes to mind :
Bell opened a new $40 million V-22 Osprey plant in Amarillo, Texas, in November 2000. The town had offered millions in incentives to lure the plant, which was supported by the state's congressmen. The new plant was not unionized, unlike Bell's other plants in Fort Worth, Arlington, and Grand Prairie. Bell also devoted about a third of its 6,300 Texas workers to making parts for the tiltrotor aircraft.
By the middle of 2001, Bell had received a handful of orders for its civil Model 609 tiltrotor aircraft--though no prototype had yet been built--and remained optimistic about prospects for the V-22, of which 14 had been delivered. Tiltrotors accounted for $432 million of Bell's 2000 revenues. "We're going to change the way people fly," was the catchphrase of new Bell Helicopter president John Murphey. Indeed, under development was an even larger version of the V-22 known as the Quad Tiltrotor, designed to carry six times the payload of the Osprey.
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/21/Bell-Helicopter-Textron-Inc.html
Be;; Textron's main competitor , Eurocopter S.A., has had some strong successes lately.
Bright Outlook in 2006
Revenues rose 15 percent in 2005 to EUR 3.2 billion. Eurocopter Spain was added during the year as the company's third "pillar." Highlights of the year included the delivery of the first U.S.-made AS350.
A number of booming markets buoyed Eurocopter's fortunes and prospects for 2006 and beyond. The overall U.S. helicopter market was having a record sales year as high oil prices prompted new investment in offshore oil exploration. There was also a need to replace the aging fleet; an official told Interavia that 60 percent of its aircraft in service offshore were more than 20 years old. There were also a great number of 1980s-era rescue choppers coming due for replacement.
Asia and Eastern Europe were a growing source of sales. According to Interavia, although China purchased fewer than ten helicopters a year, Eurocopter was expecting the country to become as large a consumer as the United States, which bought ten times as many, by 2015.
Eurocopter was developing an intermediate (six-ton) aircraft, the EC175, to accommodate increasing use of highly automated oilfields popping up further and further from shore. The company was joined in this project by China's Avic II. Deliveries were expected to begin in 2011.
Eurocopter continued its domination of the civil helicopter market, claiming a 52 percent market share by unit sales. It was the leader in several important countries, including the United States and Japan. In 2006 it was preparing to launch a subsidiary in China, where it had been working with local firms for decades. The company also had a long history with in another emerging market, India.
http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/30/Eurocopter-S-A.html
Here's an interview I found with Bell Textron's chairman and chief executive officer, Terry Stinson, circa 2001.
Q You refuse to buy market share by selling products at a discount?
A That’s correct. Now that brings us to tiltrotors. The V-22 and the BA609 represent product-differentiating technology. They pull us away from the competition. When you’re in a mature industry and that industry has bumped up against limits of growth, you reinvent the market with products like the tiltrotor. Then you can start charging a premium and average the whole company out to decent margins.
Q As a consequence of the fatal MV-22 crash in December, the V-22 military tiltrotor program is coming under tough scrutiny on Capitol Hill. Is the program in political trouble?
A I don’t think the program is in trouble at all. It’s tragic anytime you have an accident. But it’s not uncommon for these things to occur in a military program. The fact is, the reliability of the V-22 at this stage in its development is probably the best of any modern weapons system.
If you figure out who the loudest critics are, they’re not concerned about the V-22. They’re not concerned about the families. They’re concerned about getting their hands on funding for their own weapons system. But the Marine Corps is firmly behind the program. Meanwhile, our business strategy is to continue to demonstrate value by using fielded product.
http://www.defensedaily.com/cgi/rw/show_mag.cgi?pub=rw&mon=0201&file=0201bell.htm
On the other hand...
Sunday September 26, 1999 Osprey 's big cousin excites Pentagon
WASHINGTON ( Site-Telegram, Michael D. Towle ) - Last autumn, a few weeks after terrorist bombs killed 224 people at two U.S. embassies in East Africa, Pentagon planners put a question to Bell Helicopter Textron.
Could the producers of the V-22 Osprey design a tilt-rotor aircraft big enough to evacuate an embassy's staff or ferry in American troops if U.S. officials believed an attack was imminent?
The answer is the Bell Quad Tiltrotor, an aircraft developed quietly by Bell engineers over the past year. It is designed to carry nearly 100 passengers, and could be used to carry embassy personnel out of harm's way or bring in troops to protect U.S. interests.
The Quad Tiltrotor, which has captured the attention of such top commanders as Gen. James Jones, the Marine Corps commandant, would be the size of a small cargo plane, such as Lockheed Martin's C-130 Hercules. It would have two sets of wings, each equipped with two tilting rotors, and would not need a runway for landing or takeoff.
Industry analysts estimate that the cost of a single Quad Tiltrotor could be $100 million.
Like the smaller V-22 Osprey, being built as a small transport for the Marines, the Quad Tiltrotor would be able to take off, hover or land like a helicopter. But by tilting the rotors forward, the aircraft would cruise like a turboprop plane.
The Quad Tiltrotor could carry not only people; it could also transport military gear to remote locations without airfields, enabling the Marine Corps or Army to position forces much more quickly than they can now. The aircraft would have a maximum range of 2,000 miles round trip and be able to cruise at 350 mph or more.
The Quad Tiltrotor would have six times the cargo capacity of the V-22 and be able to carry up to 40,000 pounds of cargo. That means it could haul Humvees, howitzers or even helicopters into battle.
"It just seems like the right airplane at the right time," said****Spivey, Bell's director of tilt-rotor business development.
Added Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group, a Fairfax, Va., company that follows defense programs: "The V-22 is a great over-the-horizon assault vehicle, but it really doesn't carry a whole lot. What they really need is a big, big aircraft that can carry troops and a howitzer."
A squadron of just six Quad Tiltrotors, for example, could land with 400 or more troops and a substantial amount of equipment, enabling U.S. forces to secure a facility or launch an attack.
Defense analysts and Pentagon brass say such an aircraft could be useful in the post-Cold War world, in which the main threats are expected to come from rogue nations and terrorists.
None of the military services has proposed building the Quad Tiltrotor, but Bell says that if the word comes, it could have a demonstrator aircraft flying by 2004 and a production version available by 2010.
The Pentagon now envisions for its transport needs what is called the joint transport rotorcraft, a multiservice heavy-lift helicopter. But some officials say the Quad Tiltrotor should be a viable candidate.
Bell officials say more than half of the work needed to develop and build the Quad Tiltrotor has already been done for the V-22.
"About 52 percent of a V-22 could be moved to the Quad Tiltrotor," Spivey said. He added that most of the technology used in the V-22's rotors and wings and in its****it electronics could be transferred to the Quad Tiltrotor.
"It would be a low-risk, low cost, quick program," Spivey said. "This is a good time to do this. We are working the Bell 609 [a small, commercial tilt-rotor] and the V-22 and we have a lot of folks here who understand the tilt-rotor very well and it would be an excellent program to charge into here. We think it makes a lot of sense and we are getting a lot of support."
http://www.helis.com/news/1999/v22big.htm
September 24, 2005 The team of Bell Helicopter and Boeing has been awarded a $3.45 million contract by the U.S. Army to perform conceptual design and analysis of its Quad TiltRotor (QTR) aircraft for the Joint Heavy Lift (JHL) Program. "The Bell Boeing team is exceptionally pleased to have been one of the teams chosen by the Joint Service Team to take the first step in providing a truly transformational vertical lift cargo aircraft," said Mike Redenbaugh, chief executive officer of Bell Helicopter. "The critical need for long range, high speed, heavy lift without access to runways is being highlighted around the world every day."
"We view this as an important first step toward defining the next generation of high-speed, heavy-lift rotorcraft," said Ron Prosser, Boeing Phantom Works vice president and general manager of Integrated Defense Advanced Systems. "This Bell Boeing effort is a great opportunity to demonstrate the utility of cutting edge technology in meeting joint service needs."
Bell Boeing's QTR is an evolutionary application of its tiltrotor technology utilized in the V-22 Osprey. The QTR is a tandem-wing, four-proprotor aircraft with a large cargo fuselage and a rear-loading ramp. Four turboshaft engines, each mounted in one of four tilting wingtip nacelles, power the proprotors through interconnected transmissions for redundancy.
The QTR design will be sized, refined and analyzed over the next 18 months to determine program requirements and feasibility of further development. Bell Helicopter , a subsidiary of Textron Inc., is a leading producer of commercial and military helicopters and the pioneer of the revolutionary tiltrotor aircraft.
http://www.gizmag.com/go/4645/
Wind Tunnel Testing Completed on Bell Boeing Quad Tiltrotor
Langley AFB, Virginia, USA ( Bell Helicopters Press Release ) - Wind tunnel testing for the Bell Boeing Quad Tiltrotor model (QTR) was completed today at the NASA Langley Research Center Transonic Dynamics Tunnel (TDT). Installation of the 1/5th scale model into the sophisticated and unique TDT facility began June 27, 2006, with test operations conducted by Bell, NASA and U.S. Army Research Laboratory personnel.
http://www.helis.com/news/2006/quadwindtunnel.htm
So what we may be seeing here is the best PR program that Bell Textron could hope to get, and something that might overcome it's problems in the commercial market.
If all goes well.....
On the other hand, if we start to see serious problems in field with it, it could essentially kill the entire concept totally.
Quite the coin toss, if you think about it. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 5:49:43 PM | $96.2 million for each MV-22 this year, while the FY2005 defense budget request boosts the price 19% to $114.8 million per aircraft. The US Air Force requests three similar CV-22s in FY2005 for $443.0 million; or a unit cost of $147.7 million each. If the $395.4 million requested in FY2005 for V-22 research, development, evaluation and testing is included in this buy of 11 V-22s, the total cost of each V-22 is $159.7 million.
hey its only your money.... | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/10/2008 7:36:02 PM | The Osprey looked good in the Transformers movie.
However, that was a MOVIE. In real life, the Osprey has no real mission and is VERY vulnerable to groundfire. It's also extremely expensive and hard to maintain.
Most people would keep a "hangar queen" like this one ......in the hangar. Not the Corps. Or the Pentagon.
Hopefully, for the families and the troops, there will be no crashes or shootdowns. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/16/2008 7:24:24 AM | Great info you've presented, MG. I've read a lot of the first post already in other sources but not the other info.
The Popular Mechanics article talked about retrofitting it with a stinger type missile thing where the MG would go. I suppose the ultimate success of something like this is HOW overall you use it... since jets can fly with it presumably they will take care of the cover and security.
I don't get the push for this thing when VTOL technology is still so young. It was hard enough to get it working reliably in the JSF project. Why push it to big things when its hard enough to get it working reliably in the smaller jet fighters?
My instinct would be to wait awhile, take what you learned from the smaller jet experience, THEN put that into play when designing a bigger one. This has always been one of the most incredible points of diminishing return -- the harrier jump jet was always somewhat dangerous and took incredible amounts of fuel just to hover.
It also makes me wonder what use this thing really has. Think about that for a moment. Most everything we design goes into use somewhere but most have very specific intentions.
A lot of the helicopter stuff came about because it was the only thing that was effective in the mountains from when the russians took on the middle eastern folks -- we saw that, anticipated more, and built & designed towards that specific end. In other words we foreshadow our wars through our design, to a large extent.
Geography has never been my strong suit but it begs the question -- where is this Osprey the most suited for? Where is it most likely to be used? I have a feeling if I had enough knowledge of geography and aligned that with the maximum range and a few other details we could see the next war coming from maybe even a decade away. But it's just my hunch. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/16/2008 6:22:19 PM | .
What about Money....
The Marines seem to be more concerned with projects not missions........
I would like to hear a 4 star explain to a head injured Grunt the importance of the V-22, Money better spent than Body armor or real helmets or safe wheels...... one less v-22 would pay for ??????
_____________________________________________ Study: Lack of MRAPs Cost Marine Lives
By RICHARD LARDNER – 1 day ago
WASHINGTON (AP) — Hundreds of U.S. Marines have been killed or injured by roadside bombs in Iraq because Marine Corps bureaucrats refused an urgent request in 2005 from battlefield commanders for blast-resistant vehicles, an internal military study concludes.
The study, written by a civilian Marine Corps official and obtained by The Associated Press, accuses the service of "gross mismanagement" that delayed deliveries of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected trucks for more than two years.
Cost was a driving factor in the decision to turn down the request for the so-called MRAPs, according to the study. Stateside authorities saw the hulking vehicles, which can cost as much as a $1 million each, as a financial threat to programs aimed at developing lighter vehicles that were years from being fielded.
After Defense Secretary Robert Gates declared the MRAP (pronounced M-rap) the Pentagon's No. 1 acquisition priority in May 2007, the trucks began to be shipped to Iraq in large quantities.
The vehicles weigh as much as 40 tons and have been effective at protecting American forces from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the weapon of choice for Iraqi insurgents. Only four U.S. troops have been killed by such bombs while riding in MRAPs; three of those deaths occurred in older versions of the vehicles.
The study's author, Franz J. Gayl, catalogs what he says were flawed decisions and missteps by midlevel managers in Marine Corps offices that occurred well before Gates replaced Donald Rumsfeld in December 2006.
Among the findings in the Jan. 22 study:
_ Budget and procurement managers failed to recognize the damage being done by IEDs in late 2004 and early 2005 and were convinced the best solution was adding more armor to the less-sturdy Humvees the Marines were using. Humvees, even those with extra layers of steel, proved incapable of blunting the increasingly powerful explosives planted by insurgents.
_ An urgent February 2005 request for MRAPs got lost in bureaucracy. It was signed by then-Brig. Gen. Dennis Hejlik, who asked for 1,169 of the vehicles. The Marines could not continue to take "serious and grave casualties" caused by IEDs when a solution was commercially available, wrote Hejlik, who was a commander in western Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005.
Gayl cites documents showing Hejlik's request was shuttled to a civilian logistics official at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in suburban Washington who had little experience with military vehicles. As a result, there was more concern over how the MRAP would upset the Marine Corps' supply and maintenance chains than there was in getting the troops a truck that would keep them alive, the study contends.
_ The Marine Corps' acquisition staff didn't give top leaders correct information. Gen. James Conway, the Marine Corps commandant, was not told of the gravity of Hejlik's MRAP request and the real reasons it was shelved, Gayl writes. That resulted in Conway giving "inaccurate and incomplete" information to Congress about why buying MRAPs was not hotly pursued.
_ The Combat Development Command, which decides what gear to buy, treated the MRAP as an expensive obstacle to long-range plans for equipment that was more mobile and fit into the Marines Corps' vision as a rapid reaction force. Those projects included a Humvee replacement called the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and a new vehicle for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
The MRAPs didn't meet this fast-moving standard and so the Combat Development Command didn't want to buy them, according to Gayl. The study calls this approach a "Cold War orientation" that suffocates the ability to react to emergency situations.
_ The Combat Development Command has managers — some of whom are retired Marines — who lack adequate technical credentials. They have outdated views of what works on the battlefield and how the defense industry operates, Gayl says. Yet they are in position to ignore or overrule calls from deployed commanders.
An inquiry should be conducted by the Marine Corps inspector general to determine if any military or government employees are culpable for failing to rush critical gear to the troops, recommends Gayl, who prepared the study for the Marine Corps' plans, policies and operations department.
The study was obtained by the AP from a nongovernment source.
"If the mass procurement and fielding of MRAPs had begun in 2005 in response to the known and acknowledged threats at that time, as the (Marine Corps) is doing today, hundreds of deaths and injuries could have been prevented," writes Gayl, the science and technology adviser to Lt. Gen. Richard Natonski, who heads the department. "While the possibility of individual corruption remains undetermined, the existence of corrupted MRAP processes is likely, and worthy of (inspector general) investigation."
Gayl, who has clashed with his superiors in the past and filed for whistle-blower protection last year, uses official Marine Corps documents, e-mails, briefing charts, memos, congressional testimony, and news articles to make his case.
He was not allowed to interview or correspond with any employees connected to the Combat Development Command. The study's cover page says the views in the study are his own.
Maj. Manuel Delarosa, a Marine Corps spokesman, called Gayl's study "predecisional staff work" and said it would be inappropriate to comment on it. Delarosa said, "It would be inaccurate to state that Lt. Gen. Natonski has seen or is even aware of" the study.
Last year, the service defended the decision to not buy MRAPs after receiving the 2005 request. There were too few companies able to make the vehicles, and armored Humvees were adequate, officials said then.
Hejlik, who is now a major general and heads Marine Corps Special Operations Command, has cast his 2005 statement as more of a recommendation than a demand for a specific system.
The term mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle "was very generic" and intended to guide a broader discussion of what type of truck would be needed to defend against the changing threats troops in the field faced, Hejlik told reporters in May 2007. "I don't think there was any intent by anybody to do anything but the right thing."
The study does not say precisely how many Marine casualties Gayl thinks occurred due to the lack of MRAPs, which have V-shaped hulls that deflect blasts out and away from the vehicles.
Gayl cites a March 1, 2007, memo from Conway to Gen. Peter Pace, then the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in which Conway said 150 service members were killed and an additional 1,500 were seriously injured in the prior nine months by IEDs while traveling in vehicles.
The MRAP, Conway told Pace, could reduce IED casualties in vehicles by 80 percent. He told Pace an urgent request for the vehicles was submitted by a Marine commander in May 2006. No mention is made of Hejlik's call more than a year before.
Delivering MRAPs to Marines in Iraq, Conway wrote, was his "number one unfilled warfighting requirement at this time." Overall, he added, the Marine Corps needed 3,700 of the trucks — more than three times the number requested by Hejlik in 2005.
More than 3,200 U.S. troops, including 824 Marines, have been killed in action in Iraq since the war began in March 2003. An additional 29,000 have been wounded, nearly 8,400 of them Marines. The majority of the deaths and injuries have been caused by explosive devices, according to the Defense Department.
Congress has provided more than $22 billion for 15,000 MRAPs the Defense Department plans to acquire, mostly for the Army. Depending on the size of the vehicle and how it is equipped, the trucks can cost between $450,000 and $1 million.
As of May 2007, roughly 120 MRAPs were being used by troops from all the military services, Pentagon records show. Now, more than 2,150 are in the hands of personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Marines have 900 of those.
One section of Gayl's study analyzes a letter Conway sent in late July 2007 to Sens. Joseph Biden, D-Del., and Kit Bond, R-Mo., two critics of delays in sending equipment to Iraq.
More heavily armored Humvees were determined to be the best response to the 2005 MRAP request, the commandant told the senators. He also said the industrial capacity to build MRAPs in large numbers "did not exist" when the request was submitted. Additionally, although the trucks had been fielded in small numbers, they were not adequately tested and exhibited reliability problems, the letter said.
The letter to the senators is evidence of the "bad advice" senior Marine Corps leaders receive, Gayl contends. The letter, he says, portions of which were probably drafted by the Combat Development Command, omitted that the urgent 2005 request from the Iraq battlefield specifically asked for MRAPs — and not more heavily armored Humvees. It also ignored the Marines' own findings that armored Humvees wouldn't stop IEDs.
Conway's assertion there was a lack of manufacturing capacity to build MRAPs is "inexplicable," Gayl says. Manufacturers would have hurried production if they knew the Marines wanted them and any reliability issues would have been resolved, he says.
In late November, the Marine Corps announced it would buy 2,300 MRAPs — 1,400 fewer than planned. Improved security in Iraq, changes in tactics, and decreasing troop levels allowed for the cut. But Marine officials also listed several downsides to the MRAP: The vehicles are too tall and heavy to pursue the enemy down narrow streets, on rough terrain or across many bridges.
If MRAPs arrived to Iraq late, or proved too bulky for certain missions, the Marine Corps should have come up with different and better solutions several years ago when the IED crisis was growing, Gayl contends.
A former Marine officer, Gayl spent nearly six months in Iraq in 2006 and 2007 as an adviser to leaders of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.
His stinging indictment of the Marine Corps' system for fielding gear is not a first. He has been an outspoken advocate for non-lethal weapons, such as a beam gun that stings but doesn't kill and "dazzlers" that use a powerful light beam to steer unwelcome vehicles and people from checkpoints and convoys.
The failure to send these alternative weapons to Iraq has led to U.S. casualties and the deaths of Iraqi civilians, Gayl has said.
Gayl filed for whistle-blower protection in May with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel. He said he was threatened with disciplinary action after meeting with congressional staff on Capitol Hill.
Biden and Bond rebuked the Marine Corps in September for "apparent retaliation" against Gayl.
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Associated Press researcher Monika Mathur contributed to this report from New York. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/17/2008 9:54:38 PM |
They named it after the wrong bird.
It should be called "Sitting Duck."
Not necessarily. It's basically small troop transport.
Did you know the first B-17s were lost in large numbers? Later it earned the title Flying Fortress
Until they figured out the proper formation. Chances are there is going to be a learning curve to this thing, too. I would think its speed will bring it into compatibility to fly side by side with the new VTOL JSF(I see that is now GSF) jets which in turn can handle any defensive. It all depends HOW it is deployed.
The standard for these fighters, for years, have been to carry as much payload as they weigh. 14,000 # vehicle = 14,000 pounds of bombs, rockets, sidewinder missiles, ecms, etc... Now that fighter can hover and match the aeronautical movements of the Osprey there is no reason it has to be anything close to a sitting duck. From the air force's own website:
http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=199
Features A combination of sensor capability, integrated avionics, situational awareness, and weapons provides first-kill opportunity against threats. The F-22A possesses a sophisticated sensor suite allowing the pilot to track, identify, shoot and kill air-to-air threats before being detected. Significant advances in****it design and sensor fusion improve the pilot's situational awareness. In the air-to-air configuration the Raptor carries six AIM-120 AMRAAMs and two AIM-9 Sidewinders.
The F-22A has a significant capability to attack surface targets. In the air-to-ground configuration the aircraft can carry two 1,000-pound GBU-32 Joint Direct Attack Munitions internally and will use on-board avionics for navigation and weapons delivery support. In the future air-to-ground capability will be enhanced with the addition of an upgraded radar and up to eight small diameter bombs. The Raptor will also carry two AIM-120s and two AIM-9s in the air-to-ground configuration. Advances in low-observable technologies provide significantly improved survivability and lethality against air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. The F-22A brings stealth into the day, enabling it to not only protect itself but other assets.
here, a quick review: Armament: One M61A2 20-millimeter cannon with 480 rounds, internal side weapon bays carriage of two AIM-9 infrared (heat seeking) air-to-air missiles and internal main weapon bays carriage of six AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles (air-to-air loadout) or two 1,000-pound GBU-32 JDAMs and two AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles (air-to-ground loadout)
Now that they can hover they are vastly superior to jets of the past and basically make helicopters a thing of the past. They found out from the wars in desserts that hovering helicopters make a nearly perfect anti-tank weapon as well which would probably be the biggest potential ground threat to something like an Osprey. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/18/2008 12:40:21 PM | The two huge problems I see with the Osprey are the lack of auto-rotation and the VRS problem - and these are unchangeable with the design.
Even as a civilian craft, either of these two things occurring means big trouble. In combat, they will cost far more lives potentially. The more complex something is, the greater the chance of failure. If such a failure occurs, the airframe falls out of the sky from whatever height it's at.
I'm not so sure that the basic principle is even valid in a civilian craft, as they seem to be based on much the same mentality as the Titanic's designer calculating that less lifeboats would be needed - as the ship was unsinkable.
Engines do quit, for whatever reason. Pilots may make a quick move in a landing pattern to avoid a problem. In the Osprey's case, even at a civilian airport, both would potentially be fatal accidents - simply due to the design limitations.
Many of the "plus" arguments for it's combat role are due to the fact it's been set up to look that way. By not heavily armoring it, and not having even a basic in air defense system that can be used against a ground threat, great weight has been saved. That savings allows the range and speed of the craft to be artificially high. By rushing the test phrase through important things like various flight profiles and landings (especially in dust/sand) the possibility is lost to examine the chances of additional failures.
It would seem to me that one could design a helicopter that could meet the requirements (except for the air speed aspect) far more efficiently. That design has proven it's worth. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/18/2008 12:59:57 PM |
Many of the "plus" arguments for it's combat role are due to the fact it's been set up to look that way. By not heavily armoring it, and not having even a basic in air defense system that can be used against a ground threat, great weight has been saved. That savings allows the range and speed of the craft to be artificially high. By rushing the test phrase through important things like various flight profiles and landings (especially in dust/sand) the possibility is lost to examine the chances of additional failures.
It would seem to me that one could design a helicopter that could meet the requirements (except for the air speed aspect) far more efficiently. That design has proven it's worth.
I agree. In fact that is part of why I question where it will be used -- some big wig way up the chain already has multiple scenarios in mind for where and how it is to be used, potentially. The VTOL is obviously a huge part of that -- think some place without runways.
Otherwise a C-130 is fine. So what does this tell us? Somewhere in the artic or anartic? Someplace less built up like north korea, perhaps ?
But also the way the gov process is they often have things designed like this and later will sacrafice 2 of the marine seats /weight for additional equipment.
I agree its a poorly designed behemoth. Which is why I said my approach would be to wait until they learn more with the fighters with the same technology AND THEN built larger troop transport with runwayless technology. | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/21/2008 11:54:08 AM | The Osprey is already in theater (Iraq), being a former aerial gunner on the CH-46E, I'll garanteed that will not be used in special ops. That aircraft is too loud it barely has defensive capabilities one gun and it's very easy target too shoot. I wouldn't fly in that aircraft. No way!! | |
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| The V-22 Osprey goes to war Posted: 2/25/2008 12:06:05 AM | The Osprey is unfortunately a weapon designed by a committee, then modified by the bean-counters to be absolutely useless for anyone. Not to mention being a handful to fly at the best of times. The people behind this debacle need to consider their next moves much more carefully. | |
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